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QUALIFIED DISCLAIMER OF JOINT TENANCIES: A
POLICY AND PROPERTY LAW ANALYSIS
D.L. Uchtmann *
H.E. Hartnell * *

INTRODUCTION

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 1 enacted a federal disclaimer provision under which no federal gift tax is incurred by the disclaimant if the
requirements for a "qualified disclaimer" are met. 2 In a number of
private letter rulings, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that disclaimers made by surviving joint tenants were not qualified because there
had been a prior acceptance of the interest or its benefits. 3 To support
this conclusion, the Service relied" upon the ancient property concept
that a joint tenant is seised both of the whole and of the part from the
moment the tenancy is created.4
The position of the Service regarding the disclaimer of joint ten• Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Urbana. B.S., 1968, University of Illinois; M.A., 1972, University of Leeds; J.D., 1974, Cleveland State University. Member, Ohio and Illinois bars.
•• Research assistant, agricultural law, University of Illinois, Urbana. B.A., 1976, J.D.,
1980, University of Illinois.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
2. I.R.C. § 2518(b) defines a qualified disclaimer as:
an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest in property but
only if(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the trausferor of the interest, his legal representative, or
the holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest relates not later than
the date which is 9 months after the later of(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such person is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits, and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on the part of
the person making the disclaimer and passes either(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.
I.R.C. § 2045 refers to § 2518 for the estate tax consequences of a disclaimer.
3. See text & notes 38-50 infra; I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3).
4. See 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11619 (1979).

988

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

ancy property is important both because of the increasing number of
states that have adopted disclaimer statutes applicable to joint tenancy
properties and the widespread use of joint tenancy ownership between
spouses, especially farm couples. s Spouses often utilize the joint tenancy form of ownership because it provides a simple way of accom,plishing many estate planning goals unrelated to tax minimization.
Regrettably, the joint tenancy form of ownership often results in an
estate tax disaster in larger estates when the total estate tax burden of
both spouses is finally determined. Many a surviving spouse does not
fully appreciate this fact until after the other spouse has died. If the
disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest is a qualified disclaimer, a surviving spouse can effect a post mortem cure of this tax disaster by forfeiting the right of survivorship6-something the couple probably would
have done before death if the couple had sought and received sound
estate planning advice. But if the disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest
is not a qualified disclaimer, many couples who have not terminated a
joint tenancy during their lifetime will pay considerably more total estate tax than couples possessing identical wealth who transformed their
joint tenancy interests into other forms of property ownership more
compatible with estate tax minimization objectives.
In light of the present position of the Service on the issue of joint
tenancy disclaimers and the importance of this issue in many estates, a
thorough analysis of this issue is warranted. The following sections of
this Article will examine: 1) whether such a disclaimer should be
treated as a "qualified disclaimer" on policy grounds; and 2) whether a
disclaimer or the "accretive portion" of a joint tenancy interese by a
surviving joint tenant meets the technical requirements of a "qualified
disclaimer" under federal law in light of contemporary property law. 8
5. Despite the scarcity of empirical research, co=entators suspect that joint tenancies enjoy wide popularity today. Mattis, Severance of Joint Tenancies by Mortgages: A Contextual Approach, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27, 38-40. An empirical study ofIowa counties suggested a preference
for joint tenancy over tenancy in co=on. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and
Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REV. 582, 617, 623 {l966}. See D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 657 (1977). For a listing of states expressly providing for
the disclaimer of joint tenancy interests, see note 19 infta.
6. Of course, the right of survivorship is what made joint tenancy attractive in the first place.
7. The "accretive portion" in a joint tenancy is the one-half undivided interest effectively
passing from the deceased joint tenant to the surviving joint tenant by right of survivorship. The
initial one-half undivided interest held by the survivor plus the accretive portion passing at death
results in outright ownership of the whole property by the survivor.
8. The facts in this discussion generally involve joint tenancies in real property between
husband and wife, but the arguments are just as persuasive in a nonmarital, personal property
setting. The requirements for the existence of a joint tenancy estate are that the co-owners "have
one and the same interest accruing by one and the same conveyance co=encing at one and the
same time and held by one and the same undivided possession." Hood v. Co=onwealth Trust &
Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 423, 34 N.E.2d 414, 420 (1941). Although the four unities (time, title,
interest, and possession) were strictly required at co=on law, Jackson v. O'Connell, 23 Ill. 2d 52,
55-56, 177 N.E.2d 194, 195 (1961), these strict requirements have been modified over centuries,
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DISCLAIMER OF THE ACCRETIVE PORTION BY THE SURVIVING
JOINT TENANT: A POLICY ANALYSIS

A. A Sketch

0/ Federal Estate and Gfft Taxation Policies

In addressing the policy question of wheth~r the disclaimer of a
joint tenancy interest should be treated as a qualified disclaimer under
federal law, it will be helpful to sketch the various policies that underpin the federal estate and gift tax system. The American Law Institute
articulated seven goals in formulating recommendations for reform of
the federal estate and gift tax system:
In relation to any proposals in the gift and estate tax area, a decision
must be made on the goals which tax legislation in this field is
designed to accomplish. The goals which have guided this Study are
as follows (not necessarily listed in the order of their importance):
(1) to produce revenue;
(2) to impose reasonable restrictions on the inheritance of wealth;
(3) to guard against the destruction of incentives to accumulate
wealth;
(4) to reduce, if not eliminate, the circumstances under which the
form of a transfer will affect the tax result;
(5) to have a tax system that is readily understandable in the normal and routine transfer situations;
(6) to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner; and
(7) to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair.
It is obvious that in some instances the achievement of some of these
goals will call for solutions directly opposite to the achievement of
other goals. In such instances, a decision has to be made as to which
goals should predominate.9
To determine whether these underlying policies are served by the
Service's position regarding the disclaimer of joint tenancy interests, it
is necessary to identify the practical consequences of that position.

B. .Disallowing the .Disclaimer: Practical Results
The consequences of the Service's position that a surviving joint
tenant cannot disclaim the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest
because of a prior acceptance can best be seen by example. Since the
issue of disclaiming joint tenancies is especially important in agriculparticularly concerning the unity of time. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 616. Contemporary
statutes frequently provide for the creation and existence of joint tenancies.
At common law, a joint tenancy between spouses also involved a fifth unity, that of person.
Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 272, 63 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954). This particular estate, a tenancy
by the entirety, still exists in many states. In other states, there is no property law difference
between a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy between spouses. For a helpful discussion
of property law, see 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1770-1833 (1979).
9. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REpORTERS' STUDIES 78 (1969).
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tural estates, the following examples deal with land held by a farm
couple.
In both examples, the couple's only property is assumed to be
farmland worth one million dollars.1O It is further assumed that the
farm real estate was acquired through the equal contributions of both
spouses and that the annual rate of appreciation in value is zero. Deductions for debts, estate administration expenses, state death taxes,
and other expenses are assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity.
In the first example, the farm real estate is held by the husband
and wife as equal tenants in common with each spouse bequeathing his
or her interest to the other at death. In the second example, the farm
real estate is assumed to be held by the husband and wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Both examples illustrate the total federal estate taxes paid by husband and wife before the property is finally
distributed to the next generation, assuming one spouse survives the
other by at least ten years.
EXAMPLE 1. Tenancy in Common Ownership: Effective Disclaimer
by Surviving Spouse
First spouse dies in 1981; $500,000 individual interest in
farm real estate bequeathed to surviving spouse; surviving spouse executes qualified disclaimer allowed under
present law by which the real estate passes to children:
Federal Estate Tax Payable ..... '" ................... , .... $108,800 11
Surviving spouse dies ten years later, without remarrying; leaves $500,000 undivided interest in real estate to
children:
Federal Estate Tax Payable ............................... , $108,800
Total Tax Paid in Both Estates ........................... , $217,600
EXAMPLE 2. Joint Tenancy Ownership: Disclaimer Disallowed by
Service
First spouse dies in 1981; $500,000 undivided interest in
farm real estate passes to surviving spouse; disclaimer
by spouse disallowed by the Service:
Federal Estate Tax Payable ................................. $23,800 12
10. The example is not at all unrealistic. It could represent a 300 acre Illinois farm worth a
little over $3000 per acre.
II. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010. A $500,000 adjusted gross estate minus a zero marital deduction equals a $500,000 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $155,800 in tentative tax from
which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit (available in 1981 and thereafter). Assume the
$108,800 is paid by selling farm real estate of equivalent value. The identical calculation also
applies to the estate of the surviving spous~ ten years later.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010. A $500,000 adjusted gross estate minus a $250,000 marital
deduction equals a $250,000 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $70,800 in tentative tax
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Surviving spouse dies ten years later without remarrying; leaves $976,200 in farm real estate to children:
Federal Estate Tax Payable ................................ $289,518 13
Total Tax Paid in Both Estates ............................ $313,318

c.

Examination of Practical Results in Light of Federal Estate and
Gift Tax Policies

The position of the Service that a joint tenancy interest cannot be
disclaimed for federal estate and gift tax purposes is clearly in conflict
with at least three of the general goals attributed to our federal estate
and gift tax system by the American Law Institute. Specifically, such a
position is inconsistent with the goals "to reduce, if not eliminate, the
circumstances under which the form of a transfer will affect the tax
result," "to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner," and
"to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair."14
In both examples above, the original intent of the parties was to
have the surviving spouse own all of the farm real estate. In the first
example, the surviving-spouse acquires the second half of the property
by testate succession; in the second example, the surviving spouse acquires the accretive portion of the joint tenancy interest by right of survivorship. In effect, the only difference between these examples is the
form of the anticipated transfer of the second one-half undivided interest to the surviving spouse. Yet, under the Service's present position,
this subtle difference in form is of critical importance because the transfer by will can be disclaimed whereas the transfer by right of survivorship cannot. The resulting tax cost of this subtle difference in form is
almost $100,000 under the circumstances of the above examples.
Furthermore, the parties in the examples are similarly situated up
to the time of the first spouse's death. In both examples the parties are
married, the total property rights are initially divided equally between
the spouses, the combined wealth of the husband and wife is exactly
one million dollars, the children ultimately receive the property, and, as
will be apparent in the later technical analysis, the right of each spouse
to enjoy his or her undivided interest in the real estate is essentially
identical. Nevertheless, under the present position of the Service, one
couple must pay considerably more federal estate tax than the other
similarly situated couple.
from which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit. Assume the $23,800 is paid by selling farm
real estate of equivalent value.
13. See I.R.C. §§ 2001,2010. A $976,200 adjusted gross estate minus a zero marital deduction equals a $976,200 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $336,518 in tentative tax from
which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit.
14. See text & note 9 supra.
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Finally, in disallowing a qualified disclaimer by a surviving joint
tenant, the tax system also is vulnerable to attack on the simple, yet
persuasive ground of unfairness. In larger estates, such as those illustrated in the examples, any estate plan that concentrates all of the
couple's wealth in the hands of the surviving spouse generates considerably more estate tax than would be generated if the total wealth had
been divided between their estates. This unfair result occurs because of
the progressive nature of this taxiS and because half the estate is taxed
twice. Well-advised individuals are aware of this fact and typically develop estate plans that avoid concentrated, outright ownership in the
surviving spouse, either directly or by the planned use of disclaimers. 16
Unfortunately, joint tenancy ownership between spouses automatically results in concentrated outright ownership in the surviving
spouse and the attendant adverse estate tax consequences. Disallowing
the qualified disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest prevents the surviving spouse from curing this estate tax disaster. Thus, couples who utilize joint tenancy as a simple way of transferring ownership to the
survivor because they lack adequate estate tax knowledge or advice are
unfairly required to pay a severe estate tax penalty for their lack of
sophistication. Congress could not have intended that joint tenants be
punished for not having been warned by legal counsel of the dangers of
joint tenancy ownership. To impose such a result through the estate
and gift tax system smacks of unfairness, especially to the ordinary citizen.
The American Law Institute recognized that it is not always possible to promote all seven of its goals at the same time. 17 But the only
goal achieved by the Service's present policy is that of raising revenue.
That goal, however, can be accomplished in a manner that does not
discriminate against joint tenancy ownership. 18
15. See I.R.C. § 2001. The progressive nature of the tax is reflected in the rate structure
which is 18% in the first bracket, increasing to 70% in subsequent brackets.
16. Interestingly, the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, included a
provision that allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an outright bequest but indirectly retain an
income interest therein if the will provides that property disclaimed by a spouse passes to remaindermen with the income to be paid to the disclaiming spouse for life. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4). The
indirect retention of an income interest allows a surviving spouse to enjoy the income and use of
all the couple's combined property during lifetime (that property owned outright and that property in which a life income interest is indirectly retained) while still avoiding the tax problems of
concentrated outright ownership.
17. See text & note 9 supra.
18. In addition to being inconsistent with three goals of the federal estate and gift tax system
discussed above, see text at note 14 supra, the Service's denial to joint tenants of the effective use
of the disclaimer provision is inconsistent with recent developments treating joint tenants more
like tenants in common for estate and gift tax purposes. For example, the enactment of qualified
joint interest provisions reflects an attempt to ease the tax burden on joint tenants by providing
special estate tax treatment to qualified joint tenancies identical to the treatment accorded tenancies in common. See I.R.C. §§ 2040(b), 2515A.
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DISCLAIMER OF THE ACCRETIVE PORTION BY THE SURVIVING
JOINT TENANTS: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF
CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY LAW

In developing a technical analysis of the disclaimer issue, it is
helpful to identify the relationship between federal and state disclaimer
statutes. It is also essential to consider whether the four requirements
of the federal disclaimer law are met when a surviving spouse disclaims
the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest.

A. Relationship of Federal and State .Disclaimer Law
Numerous states have statutes that permit a surviving joint tenant
to disclaim the accretive portion of the estate derived through survivorShip.19 When a disclaimer is made, the accretive portion passes as
though the survivor had predeceased the other joint tenant. 20 If a disclaimer is to be effective in remedying the inequity of the federal estate
tax, however, it must meet the requirements of a "qualified disclaimer"
under federal tax law. 21
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, it was clear that a disclaimer must be valid under state law before it cou14 be recognized for
federal tax purposes,22 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added sections
19. For example, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, § 211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81) states: "A surviving joint tenant may disclaim in whole or in part any property or interest therein held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship with a deceased joint tenant. An accretive portion derived
through survivorship is a separate interest in the property or interest for purposes of this section."
Id Other states also have disclaimer laws that specifically permit disclaimers of joint tenancy
property. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-280 1(A) (Supp. 1980-81); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 623202(a) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-300 (West Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 560:2-801 (1976 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-801(a) (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1252 (Supp. 1980-81); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 9-201 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 191A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352(a) (1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §§ 22-23 (West Supp. 1980-81) (statute broadly describes interests that may be
disclaimed although no specific provision deals with joint tenancy); S.D.CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 43-4-30.1 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(1) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1l.86.020 (Supp. 1980-81). Generally, all states have statutes allowing the disclaimer of property
that would pass to the disclaimant by virtue of the state's statute of descent and distribution. For a
detailed listing of these statutes, see Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Reform Act of 1976:
Chaos out of Disorder, 31 U.S.C. TAX INST. 811, 822 n.41 (1979). But see Comment, Federal
Taxation: Section 2518 Disclaimers-Anything But Uniform, 31 U. B.A. L. REV. 188, App. D, at
209 (1978) (Ala., Miss., N.H., N.J., Nev., S.C., Vt., and Wyo. have no disclaimer statutes applicable to intestate interests).
20. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). The disclaimer
severs the joint tenancy. After the severance, the surviving joint tenant becomes a tenant in common with the takers of the accretive portion because the unities of both time and title are destroyed by the disclaimer. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 618.
2l. See I.R.C. § 2518 (gift tax), set forth in note 2 supra. Section 2518 applies with respect to
transfers creating an interest in the disclaimant made after December 31, 1976. H.R. REP. No. 941380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-68 (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3419,
3419-22 [hereinafter cited as Committee Report). For transfers made before January I, 1977, the
rules relating to disclaimers under pre-§ 2518 law, including the period within which a disclaimer
must be made, will still apply. Id at 67-68. Disclaimers not governed by § 2518 are governed by
Treas. Reg. §§ 25.25 11-1 (c), 20.2055-2(c), and 20.2041-3(d).
22. Prior to enactment of § 2518, the federal consequences of disclaimer were governed by
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2518 and 2045 to achieve uniform treatment of disclaimers for estate
and gift tax purposes.23 Therefore, the continuing relevance of state
disclaimer law is difficult to assess given the congressional intent to
remedy the confusion caused by the variety of conflicting state laws.
Practitioners tend to take one of two views: either that the federal
law provides a "safe harbor," or that both state and federal requirements must be met. The "safe harbor" theory views compliance with
federal requirements as sufficient to effect a qualified disclaimer. This
theory receives support from language in the legislative history of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.24 The "safe harbor" theory reflects the intent
to achieve uniform treatment of disclaimers, but can be criticized as
being logically inconsistent. 25 Those who contend that both state and
federal disclaimer requirements must be met argue that a disclaimer
ineffective under state law cannot possibly meet the requirements of
section 2518.26
The Internal Revenue Service seems to have embraced the view
that a disclaimer must meet both state and federal requirements. In a
letter ruling, the Service ruled that "proposed disclaimers will be 'qualified disclaimers' . . . if the procedural requirements of [§ 2518] are
complied. with . . . . Additionally, the disclaimer must meet the requirements of. . . [the state code] so that, under local law, title to the
property passes to the person who is to take the property as a result of
the disclaimers."27 Finally, proposed regulation § 25.2518-1(c), pub§ 2511 which provides that the gift tax applies to a transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is in
trust or otherwise, whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible. Section
25.2511-I(c) of the Treasury Regulations provides that where the law of the state of administration of the decedent's estate gives a right to refuse to accept ownership, no gift will result if the
refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer. ''The
refusal must be . . . effective under the local law." Id See Frimmer, Using j)isclaimers in Post
Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. TAX. 322, 323-25 (1978).
23. Congress especially meant to eliminate the uncertainties which result from the inconsistencies among local property rules, such as rules governing the proper time within which a disclaimer must be made. Committee Report, supra note 21, at 66-67.
24. The House Report states:
Ifthe requirements of[§ 2518 or § 2045] are satisfied, a refusal to accept property is to be
given effect for Federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the applicable local law does
not technically characterize the refusal as a "disclaimer" or if the person refusing the
property was considered to have been the owner of the legal title to the property before
refusing acceptance of the property.
Id at 67.
25. If A attempts to disclaim an interest in property and is unsuccessful under state law, then
title to that property will vest in A. How can it then be argued that A "has not accepted the
interest or any of its benefits?" McCue, j)isclaimers: A Survey of I.R.C Section 2.518 and the
Illinois j)isclaimer Statute, 1978 U. ILL. LAW F. 395, 406. Moreover, how can the property "pass
to" the decedent's spouse or someone other than the disclaimant if the disclaimer is ineffective
under state law? Frimmer, supra note 22, at 325; J. McCORD, 1976 EsTATE AND GWI'TAX REFORM ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY § 5.28(5), at 253-54 (1977); McCue, supra, at
406.
26. See note 25 supra.
27. IRS Letter RuL 7909055, November 29, 1978 (CCH). See IRS Letter Rul. 7820022, Feb.
15, 1978 (CCH).
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lished in the Federal Register on July 22, 1980, clearly states that the
disclaimer must be effective under local law in order to be a qualified
disclaimer. 28
But even where the requirements of a qualified disclaimer were
met, the Internal Revenue Service in a number of private letter rulings
has ruled that a disclaimer by a surviving joint tenant did not meet the
requirements of a qualified disclaimer.29 Because the Service's refusal
to permit surviving joint tenants to disclaim the accretive portion has
potentially serious federal estate and gift tax consequences, it is necessary to reexamine the federal disclaimer statute.

B. Requirements for a Qual!fted Disclaimer Under Federal Law
The threshold requirement for a qualified disclaimer is that there
be an iJTevocable and unqualified refusal by the disclaimant to accept
an interest in property.30 This is essentially the definition of a disclaimer.31 The four remaining requirements of § 251832 will be examined to determine whether they support the disclaimer by a
surviving joint tenant of the accretive portion of joint property.
1. The Needfor a writing

A disclaimer must be made in writing. 33 This requirement is easily
satisfied by a surviving joint tenant since state law commonly requires
disclaimers to be written.34
2. The Passing Requirement
As a result of the disclaimer, the disclaimed interest must pass
without any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer.35 In addition, the interest must pass to either the spouse of the
decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.36
This federal requirement may be satisfied when the disclaimer is effective under state law. Illinois law, for example, provides that the disclaimed (one-half of the joint) property will pass as if it was owned
outright by the deceased and as if the disclaiming party had prede45 FED. REG. 48925 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c».
IRS Letter Ruls. 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978; 7911005, Nov. 29, 1978; 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978
For a discussion of these rulings, see Section 1II(B)(3) of this Article infta.
I.R.C. § 2518(b); see Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(c), 20.2055-2(c).
31. See text & note 2 supra.
32. See note 2 supra.
33. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1).
34. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
35. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
28.
29.
(CCH).
30.

36. Id.
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ceased the decedent.37 In this way the property passes without any direction on the part of disclaimant.
3. The Problem of Prior Acceptance

a. The IRS position on disclaimers of joint tenancy property
If a disclaimer is to be effective under § 2518, the disclaimant must
not have previously accepted the interest or any of its benefits. 38 State
disclaimer law commonly contains a similar requirement. 39
Numerous private letter rulings involve an attempt by a surviving
joint tenant to disclaim all or part of the joint property subsequent to
the death of the other joint tenant. The Service usually imposes a gift
tax, finding that the disclaimer is not "qualified" since there has been a
prior acceptance of the property or its benefits.40 The existence of a
prior acceptance has generally been ascertained by analyzing the relevant state property law. 41
Two substantially identical letter rulings involved an attempt by
the surviving joint tenant spouse to disclaim the entire joint property.
In each, the Service found that a taxable gift was made,42 using a twostep analysis previously embraced by the federal courtS.43 The Service
first found that Illinois law allows a surviving joint tenant to disclaim
an interest in jointly held property. Illinois property law was then analyzed to determine whether there had been an acceptance of the benefits barring disclaimer. The Service found that under Illinois law joint
tenants are seised, at the time of creation of the joint tenancy, of an
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); accord, ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2801(D)(3) (Supp. 1980-81).
38. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ 2S.2S11-1(c), 20.20SS-2(c).
39. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(E)(2) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
§ 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
40. See, e.g., IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH).
41. IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH). Both of these
rulings deal with I.R.C. § 2511 rather than § 2S18. But see IRS Letter Rul. 780306S, Oct. 21, 1977
(CCH), in which state law was consulted to determine whether there had been a prior acceptance
for purposes of§ 2S18(b)(3). Cf. IRS Letter Rul. 7829008, Apr 14, 1978 (CCH), where the Service
consulted a tax court case, Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) (receipt of income from
trust over 2S-year period was an acceptance), rather than state law to determine whether there was
an acceptance for purposes of § 2S11.
42. IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH). The difference
is that in Letter Ruling 7912049, corporate stock was held in joint tenancy, while in Letter Ruling
791100S, certificates of deposit and a bank account were held in joint tenancy.
43. E.g., Krakoffv. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), affd, 439 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1971); Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affd, 468 F.2d 9S0
(Sth Cir. 1972). Gifts were found to have been made despite the surviving joint tenants' purported
disclaimers in both KrakoJ! and Bishop for two reasons. First, state law did not permit disclaimer
of jointly held property by the surviving joint tenant. Krakoffv. United States, 313 F. Supp. at
1093; Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. at 1348. Second, the surviving joint tenant in each
case was found to have accepted the gift upon creation of the joint tenancy. Krakoff v. United
States, 313 F. Supp. at 1094; Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. at 1348.
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undivided interest in the whole estate.44 According to this view, the
rights of each joint tenant vest at the creation of the tenancy and no
greater right accrues to the survivor by reason of the death of the other.
The rights already existing in the survivor continue while those of the
decedent cease to exist.45 Therefore, in both rulings the Service concluded that there had been an acceptance by the survivor of the entire
property upon creation of the joint tenancy, and the execution of ~he
disclaimer was actually a taxable gift of the whole interest.46
Another letter ruling involved an Arizona couple who owned a
home, securities, and mutual fund shares as joint tenants. 47 The representative of the estate of the surviving joint tenant renounced whatever
interest the survivor would have taken by survivorship. As is true in
Illinois, the Arizona statute specifically allows a surviving joint tenant
to renounce the accretive portion of the property to which the renouncing tenant woul4 succeed by right of survivorship.48 Nevertheless, the
Service relied upon a tax court decision49 to find an acceptance of the
property prior to the death of the first joint tenant. Acceptance was
found in the deposit of income from the jointly owned assets as well as
the proceeds of maturities and sales of securities into the joint checking
account, payment by the spouses of household and normal living expenses from the joint checking account, and occupancy of the jointly
owned residence by both spouses until the time of their respective
deaths.50
44. Both rulings cited Partridge v. Berliner, 325 Ill. 253, 156 N.E. 352 (1927). At common
law, a joint tenancy was seised "per my et per tout." See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 619. This
meant that each joint tenant was deemed to hold the whole estate for purposes of tenure and
survivorship, while for purposes of alienation and forfeiture each joint tenant held an undivided
share only. Duncan v. Suhy, 378 111104, 109,37 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1941). A tenant in common, by
contrast, owns only an undivided share in the whole for all purposes. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 8, § 1795.
45. The rulings cited KJajbor v. Klajbor, 406 Ill. 513, 94 N.E.2d 502 (1950); Erwin v. Felter,
283 Ill. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
46. The Service framed the issues in these letter rulings as:
1. May the surviving joint tenant disclaim?
2. If so, is the interest disclaimed
a. only the decedent's share, thus making the survivor's share a transfer that constitutes a gift, or
b. the entire amount with no gift consequences?
Because the answer to the first question was negative, the second issue was never discussed. This
is unfortunate, since the only way to achieve a sensible result in these cases is to determine what
exactly is disclaimed and whether that is the same interest which was accepted.
47. IRS Letter RuL 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978 (CCH).
48. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A)(7), (C)(3) (Supp. 1980-81).
49. Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961).
50. IRS Letter RuL 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978 (CCH). In both the Illinois and Arizona instances, the Service has ignored the state's plain statutory language, choosing instead to pursue the
uncertain notion of acceptance. In Illinois, the language of the Conveyancing Act itself speaks
against the Service's conclusion. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81) states
that the right to disclaim is barred by a prior acceptance of the interest or its benefits. Accord,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(E)(2) (Supp. 1980-81). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211 (SmithHurd Supp. 1980-81) says that a surviving joint tenant may disclaim the accretive portion of the
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b. A reconsideration of the IRS position
In analyzing the IRS position, it will be helpful to determine
whether a tenant in common who is bequeathed the remaining tenancy
in common interest is precluded from making a qualified disclaimer of
that bequest. It will also be helpful to carefully examine the contemporary similarities and differences between the interest of a tenant in common and that of a joint tenant. ,

(i) There is no prior acceptance of a tenancy in common interest.
The federal disclaimer statute permits the transferee of an undivided
interest to disclaim the whole undivided interest. This conclusion is
supported by the general language of § 25 I 8(a) that "any interest" may
be disclaimed.51 Once the tenant in common meets the writing, timeliness, and undirected disposition requirements of § 2518(b), there is
nothing inherent in the nature of a tenancy in common to prevent a
surviving cotenant from disclaiming the decedent's undivided share
which passes to the survivor by way of descent or bequest. Each tenant
in common holds a separate title and may enjoy his or her undivided
interest so long as there is no infringement upon the cotenant's share. 52
No conceptual basis exists for an argument that one tenant in common
has previously accepted the undivided interest of a cotenant which cannot now be disclaimed.
(ii) The only practical difference today between the estates ofjoint
tenancy and tenancy in common is the right of survivorship, at least in
states such as Illinois. The ancient property concepts of joint tenancy
and tenancy in common have evolved over time in order to serve
changing policies regarding land ownership. For example, at early
common law, the policy favoring the aggregation of landed estates in
the hands of a few gave rise to the joint tenancy estate. 53 Current policy, however, favors alienability of land and has produced legislation
joint estate. Accord, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A)(7) (Supp. 1980-81). The only way
these sections can be consistent is if a joint tenant has not accepted Uie accretive portion, i.e., the
cotenant's share of the joint property before disclaimer. But the Service argues that the accretive
portion is accepted because of the very nature of joint tenancy.
51. I.R.C. § 2518(a). A tenant in common's undivided interest would fall under this heading.
The language of§ 2518(c)(I) that U(a] disclaimer with respect to an undivided portion of an interest. . . shall be treated as a qualified disclaimer of such portion of the interest" seems to contemplate a more complex fact situation. One scholar suggests that the intent of§ 2518(c)(I) might be
to permit partial disclaimers, for instance, allowing a transferee of a sole interest to accept an
undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common but disclaim the other undivided one-half. J.
McCORD, supra note 25, § 5.29(1), at 254-55. See Frimmer, supra note 19, at 838.
52. The share owned by each tenant in common in Illinois is owned as an entire and separate
estate. Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 69, 24 N.E. 553, 554 (1890); 2 E. GRIGSBY, ILLINOIS REAL
PROPERTY § 907 (1948).
53. E. GRIGSBY, supra note 52, § 917.
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designed to expedite the termination of joint tenancy interests.54
The question is the extent to which early common law distinctions
between tenants in common and joint tenants have evaporated over
time. 55 If these distinctions have become blurred or have disappeared,
then a policy that discriminates between a tenant in common and a
joint tenant regarding the right to disclaim an accretive undivided interest cannot be justified. If the property rights of the tenant in common and joint tenant are essentially the same, to allow one to disclaim
but not the other on the ground of prior acceptance is inconsistent.
The following paragraphs compare the treatment of tenants in
common and joint tenants in states such as Illinois. The analysis includes a comparison of liability to one's cotenant for rents or profits,
the ability to acquire legal title from a cotenant by adverse possession,
rights to improvements, rights and duties to insure and repair, rights to
be reimbursed for payment of taxes or other charges, effects of leases
signed by only one co-owner, treatment under statutes concerning partition and homestead exemptions, right to eject a cotenant, and ability
to utilize the co-owned property as collateral for a loan.56
Rents andprofits. There is no ascertainable difference in presentday treatment of joint tenants and tenants in common on the issue of
liability of one's cotenant for rents or profits received by the tenant in
possession. In an action for partition, a tenant in common must account to a cotenant for an aliquot portion of the rents and profits actually received. 57 A joint tenant is also liable for rents and profits
re'ceived in excess of that tenant's share. 58 Illinois statutory law plainly
states that "[w]hen one or more joint tenants [or] tenants in common
. . . in real estate. . . shall take and use the profits or benefits thereof,
in greater proportion than his or their interest, such person . . . shall
account therefor to his . . . co-tenant."59 Little room for controversy.
54. For example, contemporary partition statutes typically allow any co·owner, including a
joint tenant, to initiate a partition action the result of which is a termination of the co-ownership.
4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1820.
55. At least one contemporary court in dicta has adhered to the ancient doctrine that joint
tenants are seised of the whole and therefore enjoy greater present rights in co-owned property
than do tenants in common. Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 109,37 N.E.2d 826,828 (1941). But the
repetition of scholarly Latin phrases may in fact distort the contemporary underlying substantive
law. A deeper analysis is warranted.
56. See generally 4A R. POWELL, Stlpra note 4, ~~ 601-19; E. GRIGSBY, supra note 47, §§ 907,
918.
57. Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 648, 183 N.E. 13, 16 (1932); Wolkau v. Wolkau, 299 Ill.
176, 184, 132 N.E. 507, 511 (1921); Cheney v. Ricks, 187 Ill. 171, 173,58 N.E. 234, 235 (1900). At
common law, a tenant in common had no remedy against a cotenant unless the latter had been
appointed bailiff, in which case the tenant in common was liable for what was actually received
and for what might have been received through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Woolley v.
Schrader, 116 Ill. 29, 39, 4 N.E. 658, 662 (1886).
58. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 509, 64 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1946) (dictum); People v. Varel,
351 Ill. 96, 101-02, 184 N.E. 209, 211-12 (1932).
59. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
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remains.
In the tenancy-in-common context, the question has arisen

whether a cotenant in possession must pay the rental value of the property to the cotenant out of possession. The old rule was that the tenant
in possession was not liable until a demand was made or until an ouster
by the tenant in possession. 60 In Clarke v. Clarke,61 however, this rule
was repudiated on the strength of the statutory right to an accounting. 62
Today the rule in Illinois is that rental value in excess of the tenant's
aliquot share must be paid to the cotenant out ofpossession. 63 A similar result would presumably occur if title were held in joint tenancy.64
Adverse possession. The acquisition of title by adverse possession
is fully possible as between cotenants despite the adage that "the possession of one will be presumed to be the possession of all."65 If one
tenant in common disseises another through an unequivocal ouster and
the other cotenant has knowledge of this ouster, the statute of limitations will begin to run. 66 Tbe burden of proving an ouster (or disseisin)
is seldom carried as between tenants in common. 67 Although there is
no Illinois case involving an attempt by a joint tenant to take title as
against a cotenant by adverse possession, there is such a case from the
California Supreme Court. In Dimmick v. Dimmick, 68 the California
court applied the reasoning of the tenancy in common cases in holding
that the plaintiff had not met the burden of proving an ouster. 69 This is
a logical result, since an ouster by a joint tenant is just as inconsistent
with any other cotenant's right to enjoy the property as an ouster by a
tenant in common.
Improvements. Illinois courts apply similar rules to cases involv60. Cooper v. Martin, 308 Ill. 224, 230-31, 139 N.E. 68, 70 (1923).
61. 349 ill. 642, 183 N.E. 13 (1932).
62. Id at 648, 183 N.E. at 16.
63. Burkholder v. Burkholder, 10 Ill. App. 2d 565, 565, 135 N.E.2d 504, 505 (1956).
64. No case has arisen involving a joint tenancy, but the result is presumably the same under
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1966). See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1805, at 193
n.22.
65. Knox v. Despain, 156 Ill. App. 134, 139 (1910).
66. Mercer v. Wayman, 9 Ill. 2d 441,445, 137 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1956); Clarke v. Clarke, 349
Ill. 642, 646, 183 N.E. 13, 15 (1932).
67. Steele v. Steele, 220 Ill. 318, 322, 77 N.E. 232, 233 (1906) (disseisin where cotenant sold
entire tract and grantee took possession of the property); Burgett v. Taliaferro, 118 Ill. 503, 518-19,
9 N.E. 334, 341 (1886) (disseisin occurred when cotenant made a warranty deed for the entire
estate). In the following cases, no disseisin was deemed to have occurred: Mercer v. Wayman, 9
Ill. 2d 441, 137 N.E.2d 815 (1956) (possession, collection of all rents and profits, payment of all
taxes); Harlan v. Douthit, 379 Ill. 15, 24-25, 39 N.E.2d 345, 349-50 (1942) (payment of taxes);
Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 183 N.E. 13 (1932) (possession, collection of all rents and profits,
payment of all taxes); Blackaby v. Blackaby, 185 Ill. 94, 97, 56 N.E. 1053, 1054 (1900) (tenant in
co=on paid taxes, made improvements, and took control of entire property); Busch v. Huston,
75 Ill. 343, 347 (1874) (possession, appropriation of rents and profits, making of improvements,
and payment of taxes).
68. 58 Cal. 2d 417, 374 P.2d 824, 24 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1962).
69. Id at 422, 374 P.2d at 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 859.

1980]

QUALIFIElJ lJISCLAIMER OF JOINT TENANCIES

1001

ing improvements on joint tenancy and tenancy in common property.
At partition, a court will attempt to setoff the improved portion to the
improving cotenant. If this is impractical, the improving cotenant may
recover the amount that the improvement added to the value of the
property.70
With regard to joint tenancy, the courts have said that each cotenant has full power to improve the property and that such improvements
inure to the benefit of all.71 An equivalent result has been reached with
regard to tenancies in common. In Young v. McKittrick,72 one tenant
in common drilled an oil well on the common property. When later
sued for profits by his cotenants, the improving cotenant was allowed a
setoff for the costs of the improvement.73 The improvement inured to
the benefit of all tenants in common who were able to reap the profits.
The statutory action for accounting will prevent disparate results in this
area.
Repairs and insurance. Joint tenants have full power to repair the
joint tenancy property.74 The Illinois Supreme Court in Tindall v.
Yeats 7S stated that repairs are an incident to all cotenancies, that repairs inure to the benefit of all cotenants, and that all cotenants are
equally liable for expenses incurred in their making.76 Thus both joint
tenants and tenants in common have a duty to preserve the estate.
Both types of cotenants also have an insurable interest in jointly
held property.77 In Tindall, the court stated that the insurance would
be for the benefit of all cotenants notwithstanding any clause in the
contract to the contrary.78 A similar restilt was reached in a tenancy in
common case, although by a different route. In Estate of Ray,79 the
court held that the cotenant in possession had a duty to be prudent in
preserving the common property, and declared the cotenant in possession a constructive trustee of the insurance proceeds for the benefit of
his cotenants. 80
Taxes and other expenses. With respect to the removal of charges
70. Heppe v. Szczepanski, 209 Ill. 88, 107-08, 70 N.E. 737, 744 (1904) (tenancy in common);
Capogreco v. Capogreco, 61 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 378 N.E.2d 279, 281 (1978) (joint tenancy).
71. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 508-09, 64 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1946); Jeffers v. Brua, 40 Ill.
App. 2d 156, 159, 189 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1963).
72. 267 Ill. App. 267 (1932).
73. Id at 270.
74. See cases cited at note 66 supra.
75. 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946).
76. Id at 508-09, 64 N.E.2d at 906.
77. Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever that person
would profit or gain some advantage from its continued existence and suffer loss or disadvantage
by its destruction. Reznick v. Home Ins. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1061, 360 N.E.2d 461, 463
(1977).
78. 392 Ill. at 509, 64 N.E.2d at 906 (joint tenancy).
79. 7 Ill. App. 3d 433, 287 N.E.2d 144 (1972).
80. Id at 440, 287 N.E.2d at 149.
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on the joint estate, both joint tenants and tenants in common are entitled to reimbursement on an aliquot basis. In Kratzer v. Kratzer, 81 the
court held that a husband joint tenant who had paid taxes and insurance premiums was entitled to contribution. 82 In Carter v. Penn, 83 a
tenant in common who had advanced money to remove an encumbrance was entitled to reimbursement on partition. 84 In Pure Oil Co. v.
Byrnes,85 a tenant in common in possession was entitled to reimbursement for money expended for taxes, for labor expended in protecting
and preserving the common property, and for marketing costS.86 And
in Heineman v. Hermann,87 a tenant in common who had paid the costs
of an abstract of title was entitled to an accounting. 88
Leases. The majority view is that neither a joint tenant nor a tenant in common may bind more than that tenant's aliquot portion of the
joint estate. 89 A joint tenant may lease the aliquot portion of the property, but the power to do so is subject to the right of cotenants to enjoy
the property. If one joint tenant executes a lease for the whole property
without the participation of the cotenants, the lease is presumed to be
for the benefit of all. 90 A nonsigning joint tenant who objects to the
purported lease of the entire premises, however, has a right to eject the
lessee.91 Each tenant in common has an equal right to enter onto the
whole property but may not exclude cotenants. In practice, then, a tenant in common, like a joint tenant, may lease only the undivided interest possessed by that tenant. 92
Other treatment. Three other Illinois statutes illustrate the similar81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

130 Ill. App. 2d 762, 266 N.E.2d 419 (l971).
Id at 768-69, 266 N.E.2d at 423.
99 Ill. 390 (1881).
Id at 396.
388 Ill. 26, 57 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
86. Id at 39, 57 N.E.2d at 362.
87. 385 Ill. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263 (1943).
88. Id at 199, 52 N.E.2d at 267.
89. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566,572-73 (8th Cir. 1924) (tenancy in common);
Graham v. Allen, II Ariz. App. 207, 209, 463 P.2d 102, 104 (1970) (joint tenancy); Swartzbaugh v.
Sampson, II Cal. App. 2d 451, 458, 54 P.2d 73, 77 (1936) (joint tenancy). As these cases demonstrate, there is no difference between joint tenants and tenants in common regarding a cotenant's
right to lease. For a collection of cases on leases by cotenants, see Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 797 (1956).
90. Booth v. Cebula, 25 Ill. App. 2d 411,418, 166 N.E.2d 618, 621 (1960). In this case, one
joint tenant had leased the entire property under a lease containing an exculpatory clause. When
the lessee sued the nonsigningjoint tenant, the latter was allowed to invoke the exculpatory clause
since the lease was presumed to be for the benefit of both cotenants. Id See Janusz v. Kaleta. 57
Ill. App. 2d 127, 207 N.E.2d 142 (l965).
91. In Reiger v. Bruce, 322 Ill. App. 689, 54 N.E.2d 770 (l944). a nonsigningjoint tenant was
allowed to bring an action of forcible entry and detainer to recover the property from the lessee.
The lessee does not, however, lose its rights against the signing joint tenant. National Gas & Oil
Co. v. Rizer, 20 Ill. App. 2d 332, 335, 155 N.E.2d 848, 849 (1959).
92. See Thomas v. Farr, 380 Ill. 429, 434, 44 N.E.2d 434, 437 (1942). Bul see Schwartz v.
McQuaid, 214 Ill. 357, 73 N.E. 582 (1905), where one tenant in common purported to lease the
entire estate. The lessee was in possession and paid rent for several months. The court presumed.
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the lease was made with the knowledge and consent of all the cotenants. Id at 361, 73 N.E. at 584. See also Gridley v. Wood. 206 111. App. 505.

1980]

QUALIFIEIJ IJISCLAIMER OF JOINT TENANCIES

1003

ity in treatment of joint tenants and tenants in common. The first is the
partition statute by which any interested person may compel partition
oflands held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common.93 The second is
the homestead exemption which is specifically inapplicable in any action between joint tenants or tenants in common. 94 Third, in an action
brought by a joint tenant or a tenant in common to eject a cotenant, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually ousted the plaintiff or
denied the plaintifl's rights. 9s
Another feature common to both tenancies is the ability to convert
outright ownership by one person into either a tenancy in common or a
joint tenancy. Illinois statutes allow outright ownership to be converted to a joint tenancy ownership by deeding the property directly
from the original owner to that original owner and another as joint
tenants.96 In an earlier time, it would have been necessary to take title
through a "straw person" to preserve the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession.97
Severance and creditor's rights. The doctrine of severance further
illustrates the true dimensions of the present interest enjoyed by a joint
tenant. Any action by a cotenant that destroys one of the four unities
of a joint tenancy converts that joint tenancy into a tenancy in common
and destroys the right of survivorship.98 This discussion focuses on the
unity of possession since it is directly related to the joint tenant's tenure
of the property.
The fact that a certain property transaction severs a joint tenancy
indicates the functionally aliquot nature of the present interest enjoyed
by joint tenants. For example, a conveyance by deed of one cotenant's
interest in the joint property effects a severance.99 Likewise, an executory written agreement to convey the joint tenant's interest has been
held to sever the joint tenancy.lOO
510 (1917), where some of the nonsigning cotenanlS knew of the lease, never objected to it, and
had accepted rent from the lessee. Id
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106, § 44 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
94. Id ch. 52, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). Thus, in an action to compel partition of
jointly owned property, one cotenant may not setoff the homestead as against the other. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 65 Ill. App. 3d 228,232,382 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1978) (joint tenancy); Phillips
v. Phillips, 56 Ill. App. 3d 276, 280, 372 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (1978) (joint tenancy); Gottemoller v.
Gottemoller, 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693, 346 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1976) (tenancy in common).
95. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 45, § 26 (Smith-Hurd 1944).
96. Id ch. 76, § 1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1966).
97. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 616.
98. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 451, 61 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1945). The four unities at
common law were unity of time, title, interest, and possession. In tenancies by the entirety there
was a fifth requirement-unity of person. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1784, at 64. A divorce
destroys this unity. Id § 1792, at 121-22.
99. Szymczak v. Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 545, 138 N.E. 218, 220 (1923). Lawler v. Bryne, 252
Ill. 194, 196, 96 N.E. 892, 892 (1911).
100. Naiburg v. Hendriksen, 370 Ill. 502, 505, 19 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1939).
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Uncertainty exists in Illiniois as to whether a creditor's lien or a
mortgage severs the joint tenancy. The whole subject matter of creditors' rights in joint tenancy property interests is beset by conflicting policies. The outcome of these conflicts is particularly relevant to the
question of whether joint tenants enjoy a greater or lesser present interest in joint property than do tenants in common. It must be
remembered that the Service views the joint tenant's rights as greater,
relying on the seisin per tout doctrine. 101
As will become apparent, both joint tenants and tenants in common are liable to have their fractional interests taken in satisfaction of
debts. Assume that a judgment creditor of a cotenant has properly recorded the judgment and has thereby obtained a lien against all of the
debtor-cotenant's real property located in the county. If the debtor is a
tenant in common, upon his death the debtor's undivided interest in the
property passes to the debtor's estate. 102 The lien retains its viability as
against the undivided interest. 103 Now suppose that the debtor is instead a joint tenant. If the debtor dies before the joint tenancy is severed, the surviving joint tenant takes the whole joint property by right
of survivorship, free and clear of the lien. 104 As recently stated by an
Illinois appellate court, the lien expires at the moment of death because
there is no longer any interest to which it can attach. 105
To effect a severance of a joint tenancy under Illinois law, it is not
enough that a judgment creditor obtain a lien and then levy upon the
property. The diminution of the debtor/joint tenant's interest resulting
from these acts by the creditor has been heJd insufficient to destroy the
unity of interest. 106 In Jackson v. Lacey, 107 a judgment creditor of a
joint tenant had caused the joint tenant's interest in the property to be
sold. The debtor/joint tenant died before the expiration of the redemption period. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the surviving joint
tenant took the whole property free and clear of the creditor's lien since
101. See text & notes 35-40 supra, 116 iI!fra.
102. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1793.
103. Id "Each tenant in co=on has a separate and distinct freehold title. Each holds his
title and interest independently of the others. His interest therefore can be transferred, devised or
incumbered separately and without consent of the other cotenants." Id at 137. Accordingly,just
as a lien on real estate owned individually survives the death of the owner, so too does the lien
created by a tenant in co=on survive the death of the tenant in co=on.
104. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Olson, 27 Ill. App. 432, 434, 325 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1975). The
court considered § 219(b) of the Probate Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 20-19 (Smith-Hurd
1978), entitled "No Exoneration of Encumbered Interests in Real Estate." The court concluded
that this section was not intended to alter the creditor's rights or the doctrine of severance in
Illinois, and under that doctrine the lien was extinguished at the moment of the debtor's death.
See People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958) (mortgage); Gau v. Hyland, 230
Minn. 235, 41 N.W.2d 444 (1950) (old age assistance liens).
105. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v Olson, 27 Ill. App. 3d 432, 434, 325 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1975).
106. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 454, 61 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1945).
107. 408 Ill. 530, 97 N.E.2d 839 (1951).

1980)

QUALIFIE.D .DISCLAIMER OF JOINT TENANCIES

1005

there had not been a severance before the debtor/joint tenant died. 108
When the creditor is a mortgagee of a joint tenancy interest, the
outcome upon the death of the debtor-joint tenant is less certain. The
matter of severance turns upon whether Illinois follows a title, hybrid,
or lien theory of mortgages. 109 If Illinois is a title jurisdiction, conveyance of a mortgage by the joint tenant will sever the tenancy. 1 10 Under
this theory, a joint tenant has the same mortgagable interest that a tenant in common has. 111 It is more likely, however, that Illinois is a lien
jurisdiction. Under the lien theory, there is no severance and the mortgagee holds only a lien which may evaporate if the mortgaging joint
tenant is the first to die. 112
As is apparent from the preceding paragraphs, the problem of the
disappearing lien exists as to both general liens, such as judgment liens,
and specific liens, such as mortgages.- The existence of the problem
supports the conclusion that joint tenants currently enjoy lesser rights
in the joint property than do tenants in common. An important benefit
of land ownership is the ability to use that land as security to obtain
loans. In view of the disappearing lien problem, however, a lender is
less likely to accept a mortgage or other security interest in a joint tenancy interest than in a tenancy in common interest. Unless the joint
tenant severs and thereby destroys the right of survivorship, a joint tenancy interest is practically worthless as collateral. 113
Right of Survivorship. The right of survivorship is the final distinguishing characteristic between joint tenancies and tenancies in common. 114 This distinction has been eroded in Illinois, however, since the
Illinois legislature has enabled the surviving joint tenant to disclaim the
108. Id at 531, 97 N.E.2d at 840.
109. Under the title theory, conveyance of a mortgage interest severs a joint tenancy. See
Mattis, supra note 5, at 49. Early joint tenancy cases contain dictum asserting this theory. See,
e.g., Hardin v. Wolf, 318 Ill. 48, 59, 148 N.E. 868, 872 (1925); Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194, 196,96
N.E. 892, 892 (1911). The hybrid theory received some attention in Illinois in Central Republic
Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co., 279 Ill. App. 492, 496 (1935). The modem cases assert that
Illinois is a lien jurisdiction, although none of these cases involve the question of severance of a
joint tenancy. Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Ass'n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 25, 317 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1974); Kling
v. Ghilarducci, 3 Ill. 2d 454, 460, 121 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1954); Merrick v. DaehIer, 5 Ill. App. 3d
269, 272, 282 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1972).
110. See Mattis, supra note 5, at 49.
Ill. Since the conveyance of the mortgage by a joint tenant severs the joint tenancy thereby
creating a tenancy in common, obviously the joint tenant (now a tenant in common) has the same
mortgagable interest as one who is a tenant in common from the start.
112. See Mattis, supra note 5, at 55-58.
113. This problem, especially as related to mortgages, is thoroughly explored in Mattis, supra
note 5. Mattis' solution is the same as that offered by the Indiana Supreme Court in Wilkins v.
Young, 144 Ind. I, 41 N.E. 68 (1895). The court held that a joint tenant might mortgage his
interest in the joint estate in like manner as though he were a tenant in common. Id at 7, 41 N.E.
at 70. The right of survivorship is destroyed or suspended to the extent of the mortgage lien. Id
At the death of the tenant, the survivor will succeed only to the equity of redemption. Id
114. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1779.
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accretive portion derived through survivorship following the death of
the other joint tenant. 115 In effect, this statute permits a post mortem
severance of the joint tenancy.
The previous paragraphs have demonstrated that a joint tenant
does not enjoy a greater present right in property than does a tenant in
common. Thus, as a practical matter, a joint tenancy is nothing more
than a tenancy in common with a built-in will.
(iii) No practical reason exists to allow tenants in common to disclaim their deceased cotenant's share in the joint property, while denying
that ability to joint tenants. The foregoing discussion of Illinois property law demonstrates the absurdity of the Service's position that joint
tenants, because they are supposedly seised of the whole, enjoy greater
present rights in the joint property than do tenants in common. Joint
tenants are treated aliquotly, as are tenants in common. If anything, a
joint tenant enjoys a lesser present interest in the joint property than do
tenants in common because of the difficulty a joint tenant will have in
using the land as security.
The Service has rested its analysis of acceptance on the outdated
doctrine of sesin per tout: that the joint tenant holds the entire estate
from the original investiture, and acquires no additional interest by virtue of the death of the other joint tenant. 116 The actual nature of a joint
tenancy interest should be acknowledged by the Service as it has been
by the Supreme Courts of Illinois and the United States. In Bradley v.
FOX,117 where one joint tenant had murdered the other, the Illinois
Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust upon one-half of the joint
property to prevent the murderer from enjoying the accretive portion
which he would have received as survivor.118 In United States v. Jacobs, 119 Justice Black repudiated the seisin per tout doctrine as follows:
Upon the death of her co-tenant [the wife] for the first time became
possessed of the sole right to sell the entire property without risk of
loss which might have resulted from partition or separate sale of her
interest while decedent lived. There was-at his death-a distinct
shifting of economic interest, a decided change for the survivor's
benefit. 120
These cases make it clear that in reality the joint tenant does not own
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). See text & note 19 supra.
116. See text & notes 41-50 supra.
117. 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955). See Mattis, supra note 5, at 31 n.15.
118. 7 Ill. 2d at 117, 129 N.E.2d at 705.
119. 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
120. Id at 371. Jacobs involved the law ofa state which does not recognize the common law
tenancy by the entirety as being distinct from a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between
spouses. There are a number of states which no longer recognize tenancy by the entirety. See 4
G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1791.
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the whole estate from the date of creation of the tenancy, but instead
succeeds to the accretive portion only upon the death of the other joint
tenant.
c.

Special consideration of tenancy by the entirety

In the many states that still recognize tenancy by the entirety, the

particular incidents of the estate vary widely. There are, however, fundamental bases of similarity among the states which may be extracted
as relevant to the matter of prior acceptance.
A tenancy by the entirety is essentially a joint tenancy between
husband and wife. 121 Thus, when one spouse dies, the property is
owned by the surviving spouse. 122 A tenancy by the entirety, however,
requires a fifth unity beyond those necessary to create a joint tenancythe unity of person. 123 The archaic notion that husband and wife were
one person resulted in the rule that an estate by the entirety could be
destroyed or terminated only by the joint acts of the husband and wife
or by divorce, and not by the unilateral act of either one of them. 124
Further, the- estate by the entirety was not liable for the separate debts
of either spouse, and neither spouse could encumber the land without
the consent of the other. 125 These incidents of an estate by the entirety
do not conclusively distinguish tenants in common from tenants by the
entirety.
Indeed, it is widely recognized that tenants by the entirety have an
equal right to the use and enjoyment of the estate during their joint
lives. 126 In effect, they become tenants in common or joint tenants of
the use of the estate, each being entitled to one-half of the rents and
profits therefrom during their joint lives, with the power in each to dispose of or to encumber his or her moiety. 127 In only two states does the
husband continue to enjoy the right to all of the income from the property.128 To a large extent, then, the present rights of tenants in common
and tenants by the entirety to enjoy the joint estate are similar. A surviving tenant by the entirety therefore should not be automatically
barred from disclaiming the accretive portion.
The difference between an estate by the entirety and the other two
121. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1786, at 80.
122. Id § 1792, at 128.
123. Id § 1786, at 80.
124. Id § 1792, at 125-26 n.20.
125. Id § 1790, at 107-08 n.19.
126. Id § 1789, at 100; D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 5, at 653. See State v. Brady,
53 Mo. AJ?p. 202, 206 (1893); Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 657, 9 A. 695, 698 (1887);
Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 315, 39 N.E. 337, 339 (1895).
127. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1789, at 100.
128. Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 490-91, 70 N.E.2d 294, 297 (1946); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C.
200, 206-07, 124 S.E. 566, 569-70 (1924).
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forms of concurrent ownership is that a tenant by the entirety may not
have the ability to dispose of his or her moiety.129 In practical terms,
this aspect of "seisin of the whole" is a limitation upon the individual
tenant's enjoyment of the property. Thus, it is absurd to construe "seisin of the whole" as a prior acceptance of the accretive portion of the
estate. Since a tenant by the entirety has a right to present enjoyment
equivalent to that enjoyed by a tenant in common or a joint tenant, the
,three types of tenancies should be treated similarly as far as the issue of
prior acceptance is concerned.
4. The Time Within Which a .Disclaimer Must Be Made
The written disclaimer must be received by the transferor of the
interest, the transferor's legal representative, or the holder of the legal
title to the property disclaimed not later than the date which is nine
months after the later of the day on which the transfer creating the
interest in such person is made, or the day on which such person attains
age twenty-one. 130 State disclaimer statutes establish the proper time
for making a disclaimer. 131 It is entirely possible that a given disclaimer will satisfy both state and federal time requirements.
The legislative history of section 2518 makes it clear that the ninemonth period for making a disclaimer is to be determined in reference
to each taxable transfer. 132 For purposes of section 2518(b)(2), a transfer is deemed to be made when it is treated as a completed transfer for
gift tax purposes (with respect to inter vivos transfers) or upon the date
of decedent's death (with respect to testamentary transfers).133 A disclaimer of the accretive portion by a surviving joint tenant spouse upon
the death of the first spouse is consistent with this congressional intent.
For federal estate and gift tax purposes, joint tenancy property is
taxed in one of two ways. When the original contribution of the joint
tenants is not equal,134 either there is an inter vivos gift of one-half the
value of the property upon creation of the joint tenancy and a testamentary transfer of one-half the value of the property when the first
129. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1784, at 63.
130. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-I(c) requires that a disclaimer be made
"within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existen~ of the transfer."
131. See., e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(C)(3) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
30, § 212 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
132. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, S. REP. No. 941236, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 607, 623-24, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4246,
4262. See 45 FED. REG. 48926 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2».
133. H.R. REp. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Coos CONGo
& AD. NEWS 3419, 3421. See 45 FED. REG. 48,926 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.25182(c)(2».
134. This explanation assumes that the first joint tenant spouse to die was the one who had
contributed all the consideration for the acquisition of the property. This is frequently the farm
husband.
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joint tenant dies,135 or there is a testamentary transfer of the entire
value of the property when the first joint tenant dies. 136 Under either
scheme of taxation, it is clear that for tax purposes, a maximum of onehalf of the value of the joint property is transferred inter vivos from the
donor to the donee. 137 If the original contribution of the joint tenants
was equal, there is no inter vivos taxable event at all. 138 In other words,
there is never an inter vivos taxable transfer of the whole estate to the
donee joint tenant that would trigger the timing provision of the disclaimer statute as to the accretive portion. Therefore, the survivor need
not disclaim the accretive portion until nine months after death.
CONCLUSION

Where a state has enacted a disclaimer statute allowing a surviving
joint tenant to disclaim the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest
or a tenancy by the entirety interest, the requirements for a qualified
disclaimer under federal law can also be met. Clearly, the federal requirements for a ''writing'' and a "passing" can be met.
The requirement that there be no prior acceptance can also be met
as to the accretive portion of the estate. Under contemporary property
law, a joint tenant, like an equal tenant in common, accepts an interest
only in his or her aliquot share at the time the tenancy is created. The
joint tenant has no greater right in the other cotenant's interest than
does the tenant in common. In fact, the joint tenant arguably has a
lesser right in the entire estate than the tenant in common because the
joint tenant may have greater difficulty using the estate as collateral for
a loan.
The remaining federal requirement that the disclaimer be made
within nine months can be met because the nine-month period begins
to run when the taxable transfer is made. Since the transfer of the
accretive portion is never a taxable event until the first joint tenant dies,
a surviving spouse always has nine months from the date of death to
disclaim the accretive portion of the joint tenancy property.
It is apparent that the present position of the Service is erroneous
and should be changed. The appropriateness of this change, however,
is not grounded solely in the technical application of current statutes.
The need to permit a qualified disclaimer of the accretive portion of
135. This is a "qualified joint interest" under I.R.C. § 2040(b).
136. Id § 2040(a).
137. Under similar circumstances, the creation of an equal tenancy in common constitutes an
inter vivos gift of one-half the value of the joint property.
138. I.R.C. § 2515. Except for the accretive portion, however, the disclaimer is not "qualified"
because the surviving spouse would have accepted the nonaccrelive portion of the property when
the joint tenancy was created.
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joint tenancy interests is also supported by solid policy considerations.
Only by allowing such disclaimers can our federal estate and gift tax
system achieve the desirable goals of eliminating disparate tax results
arising solely because of the form of the transfer, providing similar tax
treatment for taxpayers similarly situated, and creating a tax structure
perceived as fair by the general population.

